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EVOLUTION OF JAPAN'S FOREIGN POLICY TO AFRICA AND THE TICAD PROCESS

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EVOLUTION OF JAPAN'S FOREIGN POLICY TO AFRICA AND THE TICAD PROCESS

Pedro Raposo *

Resumo: Este artigo analisa a evolução da política externa do Japão para África de 1950 até à actualidade. As relações Japão – África são tratadas de forma detalhada centrando-se nos aspectos políticos, económicos, diplomáticos, e de assistência económica, com especial atenção para a nova estratégia de desenvolvimento do Japão para África através da Conferência Internacional de Tóquio para o Desenvolvimento Africano (TICAD) a partir de 1993. O principal argumento é que da década de 1960 até meados da década de 1980, a assistência japonesa foi mais uma necessidade na defesa dos interesses comerciais e de investimento do que uma ajuda desinteressada para África de um membro da OECD. Mas o fim da Guerra Fria, permitiu ao Japão através do TICAD ampliar o raio de acção da sua política externa ao implementar várias políticas simultaneamente.

O artigo conclui que a política externa japonesa no âmbito da TICAD representa uma alteração fundamental da estratégia de política externa centrada exclusivamente numa diplomacia económica para uma diplomacia centrada em múltiplos aspectos, incluindo os canais tradicionais de ajuda e cooperação económica, reconstrução e manutenção da paz, e segurança humana num contexto alargado de segurança nacional.

Palavras-chave: Japão, política externa; assistência económica; TICAD.

Abstract: This article traces the evolution of Japan's foreign policy to Africa from the 1950s to the present day paying special attention to Japanese aid policy instruments. It focuses on the political, economic, diplomatic, and aid relations between Japan and Africa paying particular attention to the new aid development strategy through the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) in 1993. It argues that from the late 1960s to the mid1980s Japan used its aid policy to African countries as a means to boost trade and investment ties than as an obligation of an OECD member. However, Japan's efforts to raise its influence in Africa have increased with the end of

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the Cold War through the TICAD Process. This conference amplified the space of manoeuvrability in Japan's foreign policy implementing several policy goals along a number of dimensions simultaneously.

The article concludes that the Japanese foreign policy within the TICAD Process represents a fundamental departure from the one-dimensional state-centred economic interests towards a multilateral approach in foreign policy, which include the traditional aid channels, economic cooperation, peacebuilding and peacekeeping, and human security aspects in the broader context of Japanese national security.

Key-words: Japan; foreign policy; aid; TICAD.

Introduction

Japan's foreign policy towards Africa has been limited for several reasons: First, there are difficulties of implementation such as geographical distance, and insufficiency of local staff; second, limited information was available regarding trade, investment and tourism, or civil and economic activities; and third, a lack of politico-strategic interests and only minimal strategic resources.¹ Finally, the constitutional restrictions of article 9.⁹ of Japanese "peaceful" Constitution prevent Japan to use force. Hence, Japan used its engagement in development assistance, especially in post-conflict situations as a way to circumvent its military limitations and constitutional constraints.² As a result, Japan's foreign policy naturally placed emphasis on economic policy instruments, such as trade, FDI, and ODA, which shows an unusual interaction and beneficial interdependence between them to fulfil Japan's interests of peace and prosperity and to conciliate the antagonisms resulting from its trade surplus with African regimes.³ But why does the Tokyo International Conference on Africa Development (TICAD) focus on Africa?

Before explaining the motives of Japan to organize TICAD, it is worth to mention that the economic recessions among the DAC countries generated a sense of "aid fatigue" during the 1980s, which increased with the end of the Cold War. Africa was left aside to help the former Soviet republics. So, Japan

¹ TCSF White Paper 2005, *Evaluation by Civil Society on Japanese Policy to Africa: Overcoming Poverty and Inequality*. 1st Issue, Tokyo: TICAD Civil Society Forum (TCSF), 2005, p. 4; DEBORAH SHARP, "Japan and Southern Africa: The resource diplomacy rationale," in *Japan and South Africa in a Globalising World – A Distant Mirror*, ed. Chris Alden and Katsumi Hirano, UK: Asgate, 2003, p. 102.

² SHAHRBANOU TADJBAKHSH and ANURADHA M. CHENOY, *Human Security: Concepts and Implications*, London and New York: Routledge, 2007, p. 30.

³ DAVID M. POTTER, "Continuidad y cambio en la política exterior japonesa," in *China y Japón: modernización económica, cambio político y posicionamiento mundial*, ed. Laura Rubio Díaz Leal, México: Porrúa, 2008, p. 239; JIDE OWOEYE, *Japan's Policy in Africa*, New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1992, p. 87.

took initiative in proactively addressing African development assistance in terms of translating more of its economic strength into political and diplomatic power, as the greatest donor country in the world at that time. Also, in 1991, Japan was already the top donor in bilateral aid, and a major donor in Africa after France, Germany and the USA. Consequently, the political implications turned a serious agenda. Japanese government for the first time clarified the political principles and incorporated the concepts of democracy, human rights, introduction of a market economy and concern over environmental conservation and development into its own ODA policy, including toward Africa. So, in 1992, Japan's enacted the Official Development Assistance (ODA) Charter, and declared assistance for Africa's conflicts and development issues. The ODA Charter reflects a new aid rationale favouring an active attitude towards domestic and political issues in recipient countries representing a shift from "request-based principle" thus, attaching importance to the self-help efforts of recipients.⁴ As a result, in 1993, and to prevent the marginalization of Africa in the fast-progressing trend toward globalization, Japan hosted the TICAD. Other reasons for organizing TICAD is Japan's conviction that its past experience on development cooperation in Asia is a valuable asset for Africans, and the concern that the disadvantages caused by globalization are marginalizing the African economies. Through TICAD Japan has been cooperating with African countries in several ways, considered indispensable to reduce poverty through economic growth: For example, assistance for human security, agriculture development, humanitarian and reconstruction assistance for war-torn areas to consolidate peace, and social and economic infrastructure with a human security perspective.⁵ This perspective focus on both the safety and prosperity of peoples and states emphasizing cross-sectoral infrastructure development in Africa focused on transcountry road construction, building hospitals and water supply systems, which are regarded as a top priority within the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) Short-Term Action Plan.⁶ However, several scholars state that the true reason for TICAD existence is to increase support among Africans for Japan's campaign to gain a seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).⁷ According to Sato Takuo, Japan organized

⁴ The "request basis" idea means that Japan will not proceed with a project or program unless it is considered of sufficient priority by the recipient country and that an appropriate request emanates from the country. But, in recent years this concept changed to include the idea that Japan can and will actively seek projects that fit into the new philosophy of the ODA Charter. See: OECD Development Assistance Committee, *Japan*, no.13, 1996, p. 16, 18.

⁵ SADAOKO OGATA, "Infrastructure Development and Human Security," in *Rethinking Infrastructure for Development* ed. François Bourguignon and Boris Pleskovic, Washington D.C.:The World Bank, 2008, p. 23-6.

⁶ OGATA, "Infrastructure Development," 25; NEPAD, *Infrastructure Short-Term Action Plan (STAP), Review of Implementation Progress and The Way Forward*, May 2003, p. 7.

the TICAD to contribute to African development and economic prosperity and also to acquire support to become a permanent member of the Security Council.⁸ Additionally, Africa's prosperity, stability, and economic prosperity, is important for Japan as a resource-poor country that must have access to basic goods and raw materials, which are necessary for everyday life. By organising TICAD, Japan is simultaneously contributing for African development and to its security and prosperity as well. Finally, Japan's view of the "Asia development model" is that through the synergy of ODA, trade and private investment African countries have an alternative for development. By incorporating these elements in the TICAD Process, Japan hopes to apply its Asian development experience in Africa. Japanese policy makers have begun to see the potential of Africa beyond the economic diplomacy and strategic interests of the Cold War, placing greater emphasis on the political and diplomatic aspects of ODA combined with UN related peacekeeping efforts.

After examine the evolution of Japan's foreign policy toward Africa since World War II until the present day, this paper analyses the interrelation between those changes and the diverse set of policies ranging from trade, FDI and ODA. Then, the content and intent of Japan's new activism within the TICAD Process and the concept of human security as a new component of Japanese foreign policy are analysed.

1. Evolution of Japanese Foreign Policy to Africa

The origins of Japanese diplomacy goes back to September 1951, when it signed a peace treaty in San Francisco with the Allied nations of the Western bloc, including Ethiopia, Liberia, Egypt and South Africa.⁹

Japan's African policy during most of the Cold War period are characterized by a dual diplomacy between White and Black Africa because while supporting the pro-American and anti-communist white minority regimes of South Africa, Rhodesia, Namibia, and Portugal, simultaneously, sought identification with the emerging Third World nations within the Afro-Asian

⁷ JUN MORIKAWA, "Japan and Africa after the Cold War," in *Japan, a Model and a Partner*, ed. Seifuden Adem, Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2006, p. 46; KWEEKU AMPIAH, "Japan and the Development of Africa: A preliminary Evaluation of the Tokyo International Conference on Africa Development," *African Affairs* 104, no. 414, January 2005, p. 109-10; HOWARD LEHMAN, "Japan's foreign aid policy to Africa since the Tokyo International Conference on Africa Development," *Pacific Affairs* 78, no.3, Fall 2005, p.435-36.

⁸ Interview with Sato Takuo, Second Africa Division Middle Eastern and African Affairs Bureau, Tokyo: Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 17, 2009.

⁹ JUN MORIKAWA, *Japan and Africa – Big Business and Diplomacy*, London: Hurst & Company, 1997, p. 52.

movement.¹⁰ The opportunity came with the first Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung, Indonesia, in April 1955, a gathering for the Third World countries sharing a history as former colonies. Following, Japan's entry into the UN in 1956, the will to play a role in the Afro-Asian framework as step forward to gain membership in the international community according to what subsequently became its UN-centred foreign policy was higher than before.¹¹ However, in Africa like in Asia, Japan's foreign policy had limited space of manoeuvre, and with the effective dissolution of the so-called Afro-Asian bloc, Japanese officials began to show a strong desire to pull out of Africa.¹²

In the early 1960s, a major characteristic of Japan's African policy was the pursuit of its national interests, while respecting the interests of the United States and the Western colonial powers in Africa.¹³ As a result, the question of the decolonization in Africa lost momentum on Japanese decision-makers agenda. Using the expression of Kent Calder (1987), Japan's attitude was that of a "reactive state" one following America's position less enthusiastic about decolonization *per se*, unable to initiate the proactive foreign policy declared at Bandung.¹⁴ However, in face of Japan's non-implementation of the Seventeenth United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution, demanding trade boycotts against South Africa, African nations severely opposed Japan's campaign for a non-permanent membership on the UNSC in 1965. As a result, Japan was forced to change its African policy, thus introducing economic sanctions and cultural exchange restrictions against South Africa apartheid policy. In the late 1960s, political interests rather than economic interests dominated Japan's foreign policy objectives. In the 1970s, Japan-Africa relations were chiefly in the trade and investment field and considered of secondary importance compared to Asian, Western, and Middle East affairs. However, the Nixon "shocks" in 1971, the oil crisis in 1973 and 1979, and the Iranian Revolution increased Japan's policy-makers awareness of the politicization of economic issues. So, Japanese perception of the indivisibility of economic and security matters, particularly in the realm of natural resource acquisition increased.¹⁵ As a result, Japan's ODA for Africa rose again. However, following the oil crisis, the rapid disintegration of White Minority rule as a result of the victories of African national liberation movements in Mozambique, Angola, and in Zimbabwe in 1980, and with the

¹⁰ MORIKAWA, *Japan and Africa*, p. 52-3; Kweku Ampiah, *The Dynamics of Japan's Relations with Africa – South Africa, Tanzania and Nigeria*, London and New York: Routledge, 1997, p. 48.

¹¹ AMPIAH, *The Dynamics of Japan's Relations with Africa*, p. 41.

¹² JOHN WHITE, *Japanese Aid*, London: Overseas Development Institute, 1964, p. 22.

¹³ JUN MORIKAWA, *Japan and Africa*, p. 18.

¹⁴ AMPIAH, *The Dynamics of Japan's Relations with*, 45. Also see: KENT E. CALDER, "Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the Reactive State," *World Politics* 40, October 1987-July 1988, p. 519.

¹⁵ AMPIAH, *The Dynamics of Japan's Relations with*, p. 5-7; MORIKAWA, *Japan and Africa*, p. 73.

development of the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa, Washington expected Japan to make a much larger contribution to Western Security, particularly in South Africa, Egypt, Kenya, and Ethiopia.¹⁶ Therefore, in the early 1980s, in response to requests from the USA, Japan increased aid to countries bordering conflicts and areas important to maintain the peace and stability of the international system. This new approach meant the end of the policy that separated politics from economics to justify trade with countries that did not belong to the Western camp in the Cold War. Japan's aid to sub-Saharan Africa largely reflects this. But, amidst international and African critics concerning Japan's aid quality, the Japanese foreign minister during its visit to Zambia and other countries in East Africa in 1984, announced Japan's desire to strengthen cooperation with Africa. In September 1985, Japan launched the "Green Revolution for Africa" to contribute to the radical fight against drought and famine, showed the "human face" of Japanese development, away from the focus on trade and resource diplomacy.

In October 1987, the United States Congress passed an anti-apartheid bill intended to strengthen restrictions on trade with South Africa, and Japan was forced to re-evaluate again its African policy.¹⁷ Then, the rapidly changing international environment in Southern Africa and the end of the Cold War linked to the burst of the bubble economy forced Japan to look at Africa in a more cooperative approach rather the distant attitude of the past.¹⁸ As a result, TICAD should be seen in the context of a Japanese attempt to broaden the relationship with Africa in both economic, political and security arenas. On the other side, Japan began challenging directly the US by openly criticizing the structural adjustment policies to Africa strongly supported by the US, and to sponsor international initiatives to generate alternatives to adjustment against the so-called Washington Consensus and neo-liberal policies.¹⁹ The activism rather than the passive foreign policy of Japan became quite evident in Japan's African diplomacy in the 1990s to the extent that Japan's "new development strategy" besides the political strategic importance of African countries for Japan's UN diplomacy emphasizes the necessity of integrating African countries through TICAD into the global economic and financial order.²⁰ In the security area, the "Consolidation of Peace" is one of the three pillars of Japan's policy

¹⁶ MORIKAWA, *Japan and Africa*, p. 73-4.

¹⁷ Morikawa, *Japan and Africa*, p. 87-9.

¹⁸ DEBORAH SHARP, "Japan and Southern Africa: The Resource Diplomacy Rationale," p. 103.

¹⁹ HOWARD STEIN, "Japanese Aid to Africa: Patterns, Motivations and the Role of Structural Adjustment," *The Journal of Development Studies* 35, no.2, December 1998, p. 28, 40-1; HOWARD LEHMAN, "Japan's Foreign Aid Policy since the Tokyo International Conference on African Development," *Pacific Affairs* 78, no.3, Fall 2005, p. 427.

²⁰ GLENN D. HOOK et al, *Japan's International Relations Politics, economics and security*, second edition, London and New York: Routledge, 2001, p. 380.

on cooperation with Africa adopted in TICAD III in 2003, consistent with the "new" ODA Charter (2003), which has added a "perspective of human security" as one of its priority issues. This has confirmed the promotion of the concept of human security now a pillar of Japanese foreign policy.²¹ Other examples of Japanese activism, and after the adoption of the International Peace Cooperation Law in the Diet in 1992, is the dispatch of SDF troops to Cambodia, Mozambique, Congo, El Salvador, the Golan Heights in the 1990s and to East Timor in 2002, which was impossible due to the Article 9^o of Japanese Constitution. Although, most Japanese politicians were against the engagement of Japan's self defence forces beyond Japan's borders, they could see that ODA was no longer enough to support Japan's political aspirations.²² Furthermore, Asia declined in the scale of national priorities and domestic support weakened for maintaining high levels of development assistance.²³ TICAD has become Japan's foreign policy main diplomatic channel to support its new development strategy toward Africa. This strategy includes a "comprehensive approach" to development stressing the importance of trade, private investment and market access, not only ODA. The first TICAD in 1993, marked Japan's interest in promoting not only its own model of development in Africa like has done in East Asia but also for Japan position itself as a major Asian power in Africa as part of its diplomatic attempts to play a more active role in international affairs in the post-Cold War.²⁴

2. Japanese trade policy with Africa and TICAD

Overall, throughout the Cold War Japan pursued a non-military and neo-mercantilist, foreign policy of a trading nation.²⁵ Growth in exports, particularly in the manufacturing sector was a major focus along with the building of a strong domestic economy. In Africa, Japanese interaction between trade

²¹ MOFA, *Project Study on the TICAD Process – Review of the Past Achievements and Implications for Future Success*, Tokyo: Japan International Cooperation Agency and Mitsubishi UFJ Research & Consulting Co, 2007, p.15; HOOK et al, *Japan's International Relations*, p. 15.

²² SHUNJI YANAI, "The TICAD process and African development," in *Integrating Africa: Perspectives on regional integration and development*, ed. Hans van Ginkel, Julius Court, and Luk Van Langenhove, Hong-Kong: United Nations University, 2003, p. 42.

²³ JOHN MILLER, "The Outlier," in *Japan in a Dynamic Asia: Copying with the New Security Challenges*, ed. Yochiro Sato and Sato Limaye, New York: Lexington Books, 2006, p.34.

²⁴ LEHMAN, "Japan's Foreign Aid Policy to Africa," p. 431; TAKEHIKO OCHIAI, "Beyond TICAD Diplomacy: Japan's African Policy and African Initiatives in Conflict Response," *African Study Monographs*, volume 22, no.1, May 2001, p. 49. Also see: PEDRO MIGUEL AMAKASU RAPOSO DE MEDEIROS CARVALHO, "Japan's aid policy and the TICAD Process," *Nanzan Journal of Policy Studies*, volume 1, March 2009, p. 59, 73.

²⁵ OWOEYE, *Japan's Policy in Africa*, p. 86.

and FDI shows the historical difficulties of Japanese foreign policy in dealing with the region; the lack of competition in African resources, which limited Japanese interests in Africa, and a political and economic environment that did not favour Japanese involvement in sub-Saharan Africa.²⁶

Japan's trade relationship with Africa until the end of the Cold War had three characteristics: First, a trade pattern that indicates a high degree of commodity complementarity between the two economies despite the development differences. What Japan lacks but requires in abundance, exists in large quantity in Africa. Second, Japan's trade surplus with Africa has hindered an equitable trade relationship between the two sides. Third, Japan trade partners were mostly resource-rich countries or strategically important like South Africa, Niger, Liberia, Zambia, Kenya, and Nigeria. To change this state of affairs and strengthen Japan's African diplomacy, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Keidanren (Japanese Business Federation), in the early 1970s, became actively involved in economic diplomacy, which consisted of export promotion and securing a stable supply of mineral resources. Additionally, Keidanren established the Committee on Co-operation (KCCA) with Africa in August 1970. The importance of KCCA, under the apartheid regime, was that it not only turned criticism away from the Japanese government but also served as a centralized channel where Japanese industry as a whole could consider African policy as well.²⁷

Japan's interest in Africa's mineral resources increased after the first oil crisis (1973) becoming an important national security issue. However, in the 1980s trade and investment relations between Japan and African countries decreased. Among other reasons, the worldwide recession, the falling price and demand for oil, political instability in many resource-rich African countries, weak governance, and a lack of transparency in the regulatory regime during the period, discouraged many Japanese firms from continued involvement with Africa's mining and mineral resources.²⁸

After the 1990s Japan's global supply-chain investment strategy in Africa exemplifies how trade and investment activities have become integrated and their strategies aligned. Presently, Japan's trade and investment relations with Africa are still small in total value within Japan's overall trade, though have been increasing. When compared with countries such as China, India, Korea and Taiwan, Japan was the largest importer of African products in the early 1990s. However, India and China have surpassed Japan in the mid-1990s

²⁶ DEBORAH SHARP, "Japan and Southern Africa," p. 104.

²⁷ MORIKAWA, *Japan and Africa*, p. 105, 154.

²⁸ World Bank Group, "Patterns of Africa-Asia Trade and Investment – Potential for Ownership and Partnership," Asia-Africa Trade and Investment Conference (AATIC), Tokyo: World Bank Group, Africa Region, Private Sector Unit, November 2004, p. 60.

mostly because of oil.²⁹ The end of Japan's economic sanctions towards South Africa in October 1991 opened a new era for Japan's African policy behind its economic diplomacy towards Africa. ODA to South Africa increased and Japan sought to strengthen political relations. Additionally, with the end of the Cold War, the entire economic and political structure of Southern Africa as a region suffered tremendous changes in which the end of the apartheid in South Africa were accompanied by a shift in political and economic terms towards democratization and cooperation between South Africa and the surrounding nations.³⁰ Accepting that South Africa during the Cold War was and still is the central player of Japan's policy towards Southern Africa, afterwards though its strategic and economic importance continues to be vital for Japan, other countries in the region have also become significant to Tokyo. In terms of trade relations, the six top countries for Japanese exports for the period 1988-1996 include South Africa, Zimbabwe, Mauritius, Zambia, Mozambique and Angola. The importance of Southern African region as a trade bloc and market as well for economic purposes was referred in the May 1992 Keidanren mission to the region, the same year that Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) was reorganized into the Southern African Development Community (SADC) with the goal of building a free trade system within eight years.³¹ However, the Japanese were frustrated with the lack of a comprehensive development strategy from both sides (Japan and Southern Africa) to the region; thus, forcing a bilateral approach to the countries of the region.³² Japan's realizing that in order to SADC act as a trade bloc and single market with to which to trade is necessary the development of infrastructure, especially the transportation network, very important for Southern Africa, which has six inland countries. So, as part of follow-up of TICAD I, Asia-Africa cooperation was strengthened in the "Eastern-Southern Africa Regional Workshop" in Harare, Zimbabwe in 1995 and in Yamoussoukro, Côte d'Ivoire, in 1996.³³ The broad objective of these regional workshops, which were co-organized by the Governments of the host countries, and Japan, the United Nations and the Global Coalition for Africa (GCA), was to provide a forum, among African countries, on ways and means of operationalizing the principles of the Tokyo Declaration on African Development. The discussions focused on the priority

²⁹ World Bank Group, "Patterns of Africa-Asia Trade and Investment," p. 31.

³⁰ JICA, *Regional Study for Development Assistance to Southern Africa*, Volume 1, Tokyo: Institute for International Cooperation, Japan International Cooperation Agency, February 1994, p. 23-4.

³¹ SHARP, "Japan and Southern Africa," p. 111; JICA, *The Study on Japan's Official Development Assistance*, p. 11, 15.

³² SHARP, "Japan and Southern Africa," p. 111.

³³ MOFA, *Project Study on the TICAD*, p. 4.

areas of the Tokyo Declaration, namely, peace, stability and development, including governance and conflict prevention; human resource development and capacity building; private sector development; and Asia-Africa cooperation.³⁴

Also, a survey conducted by the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) in 1999, just one year after TICAD II, concluded that the existence of Japanese ODA played a major role in Japanese companies establishment of operations in Africa. The main motives for operations in eight African countries were the future of the potential market and Japanese ODA. In southern and western Africa, natural resources were another motive.³⁵ In TICAD III, Keidanren (Japanese Federation of Economic Organizations) stressed that another reason that contribute to aware Japanese Business society for African potential was to balance against an overheated investment movement toward China. As a follow-up of TICAD III, the TICAD Asia-Africa Trade and Investment Conference (TICAD-AATIC) held in Tokyo in November 2004, stressed the importance of trade and investment promotion between the two regions in order to achieve sustainable economic development of Africa. It also underlines that increased trade and investment between the two regions would make a significant contribution to the implementation of New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD). As a follow-up to this, the Africa-Asia Business Forum (AABF) was organized. Subsequently, in June 2005, Japan and the African Development Bank (AfDB) announced a joint initiative called Enhanced Private Sector Assistance (EPSA) to finance those infrastructures projects including those listed in the Short Term Action Plan (STAP) of NEPAD aiming to develop cross border infrastructure for regional integration in Africa, private sector development, and agriculture development as a complement to ODA.³⁶

As a follow-up to TICAD IV in May 2008, a joint mission of a total of 179 participants members, organized by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) and Japanese Embassies, was dispatched to three African regions (twelve African countries in

³⁴Asia-Africa Cooperation, [on line] [1991?] available at <http://www.un.org/esa/africa/asiaafrica.html>. accessed May 28, 2009.

³⁵ The eight countries are: Egypt, Kenya, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Nigeria, Ghana, and Ivory Coast. See: The World Bank, *Studies on Africa-Asia Trade and Investment Relations: Studies of Selected Asian Countries in Developing Trade and Investment Relations with African Countries* [on line] Padeco and Japan UFJ Institute, June 2004, p. 3-2, available at <http://www.scribd.com/doc/13731020/Final-Report-Asia-Africa-Trade-and-Investment-Study-Kamiya>, accessed May 15, 2009.

³⁶ FASID/MOFA, *International Symposium Synergy among Development Assistance, FDI, and Trade in Southern Africa: Poverty Reduction through Economic Growth*, Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign affairs of Japan and Foundation for Advanced Studies on International Development, 2006, p. 30, 68-9.

total) from August to September 2008.³⁷ The aim of these missions was to collecting information and build up human networks to expand trade and investment relations between Africa and Japan. The Mission participants pointed that the main obstacles for Japanese private sector to expand business in Africa are: first, except for those of Nigeria, Ethiopia, and South Africa, the market scale is small; second, infrastructure, namely electricity and transportation, is not well prepared; third, wages are high despite low labour quality; and fourth, problems exist in governance, such as deterioration of public safety, corruption and opaque procedures. A main conclusion of this mission is that with the exception of natural resources, Japanese companies have difficulties in establishing their own business with African countries. Therefore, Japanese private sector exhorts the Japanese government to provide ODA for infrastructure improvement and human resource development to support their activities to penetrate local markets for instance through provision of materials for ODA projects.³⁸

In 2008, Japan's imports from Africa corresponded to 2.7 percent of Japan's total imports, while exports to Africa represented only 1.7 percent of Japan's total trade with the world.³⁹ As for Japan's sectoral trade, in 2006, mineral fuels represented 40.7 percent of total imports and metals with 33.4 percent of total imports, which indicates that Japan's main motive to trade with Africa still is resource diplomacy. With regard to Japanese exports to Africa, scale intensive industries (transport mechanism with 35.0 percent of total and automobiles with 24.2 percent of total) occupy a reasonable percentage of Japanese exports to Africa. With South Africa as Japan's main trade partner in Africa in 2006 both to exports (42.9 percent) and imports (50.0 percent) in Japan's total trade with Africa, it is clear that Japan must focus relations with Southern Africa on South Africa.⁴⁰

³⁷ The countries were: Southern African mission (Botswana, Mozambique, Madagascar, South Africa); Eastern Africa mission (Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Tanzania); and Central and Western mission (Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, Cameroon). (...) Unfortunately, the Southern African mission could not go to Angola due to Angola internal reasons, particularly electoral reasons. See: TICAD IV, *Comprehensive Report of the Joint Missions for Promoting Trade and Investment to Africa*, Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, December 2008, p.1-2; Interview with Sato Takuo, Second Africa Division Middle Eastern and African Affairs Bureau, Tokyo: Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 17, 2009.

³⁸ TICAD IV, *Comprehensive Report of the Joint Missions for Promoting Trade and Investment to Africa*, p. 6.

³⁹ Japanese Trade and Investment Statistics for the year of 2008, [on line], available at <http://www.jetro.go.jp/en/reports/statistics/>, accessed May 19, 2009.

⁴⁰ Japanese Trade and Investment Statistics for the year of 2007, [on line], available at <http://www.jetro.go.jp/en/reports/statistics/>, accessed May 19, 2009.

3. Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI) policy in Africa and TICAD

Overall, all major capital flows to Africa have increased considerably since 1980s, especially FDI. However, for most of the time, ODA has been the most important source of capital inflows. In 2003, ODA accounted for 46 percent of all capital inflows while FDI represented 24 percent of all capital inflows to Africa. During 2002-2004, Africa received a little over 2 percent of FDI inflows in the world.⁴¹ Political and economic instability, poorly developed infrastructure, and the spread of HIV/AIDS are some of factors influencing the low level of FDI into Africa. Yet, FDI to Africa has been increasing, and amounted to US\$29 billion in 2005, US\$46 in 2006 and US\$53 in 2007 their highest level so far, up from US\$18.1 billion in 2004.⁴²

In regard to Japanese foreign direct investment (JFDI), the greater portion of JFDI in Africa has been made by global trade companies know as Sogo Shosha, investing directly in sub-Saharan Africa, which consists mainly of large industrial conglomerates. From the 1960s to the 1980s, JFDI were targeted at Africa's domestic markets. Examples include investments in home electronic appliance and textile plants. The aim of these investments was the to supply Africa's local markets, which were protected by high tariffs under government's import substitution polices.⁴³

In the 1990s Japan changed its investment strategy, now targeted at third countries, especially in the European Union and United States. As a result, during the 1990s, JFDI toward Africa sharply decreased. However, recently African efforts to increase regional economic integration and local governments import liberalization have eliminated the competitive advantage of such investments vis-à-vis goods importation. Therefore, JFDI to Africa increased in scale to exploit existing favourable trade regimes, mostly in the automobile sector.

The historical comparison of the sectoral composition of JFDI to Africa shows that the focus of FDI has shifted over the past three decades. Transportation has been dominant from the 1971 to 2001. However, the mining investment, which had more than a 30 percent share in the 1970s, declined to only 1 percent in the 1990s, thus suggesting that the main objective of Japanese firms in Africa is no longer resource diplomacy. However, Ampiah stress that the main problem is not so much lack of interest of Japanese firms, but rather that the sector is monopolized, especially in South Africa.⁴⁴

⁴¹ United Nations – Economic Commission for Africa, *Economic Report on Africa 2006 – Capital Flows and Development Financing in Africa*, Ethiopia: Economic Commission for Africa, December 2006, p. 46.

⁴² UNCTAD, *World Investment Report – Transnational Corporations, and the Infrastructure Challenge*, New and Geneva: United Nations, 2008, p. 37.

⁴³ World Bank Group, *Patterns of Africa-Asia Trade and Investment*, p. 56.

⁴⁴ AMPIAH, *The Dynamics of Japan's Relations with*, p. 60.

By country, Japanese FDI (JFDI) in Africa is largely concentrated in two countries: Liberia and South Africa. Other countries that have been receiving some JFDI are Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Madagascar and Mauritius, with less extent Mozambique.⁴⁵ Considering that direct investment to Liberia has been focused on obtaining flag-of-convenience ships, the majority of JFDI is concentrated on South Africa, and the rest of Africa has been almost ignored.

With regard to JFDI in Africa during the four TICAD held so far, from 1993 to 2008, it accounted for US\$11,621 million as the end of 2007, with US\$7,159 million for the period 1951-1992, before the organization of TICAD.⁴⁶ This indicates that although JFDI remains largely on the periphery of FDI in Africa, it seems that with the TICAD Process, the private sector investment in Africa has increased quite considerably. In this line, the concrete actions taken by TICAD and progress made are as follows.

TICAD I in October 1993, was very successful in encouraging African countries to take ownership of their development and in strengthening the partnership of the international community as it strives to address this issue. As part of the follow-up of TICAD I, cooperation between Asia and African countries was strengthened in July 1995 with the East and South African Regional Workshop in Zimbabwe in July of 1995.

In October 1998, TICAD II marked a beginning by expressing the principles in African development and adopting an Action Plan, where the followings were announced as the Japan's New Assistance Programme for Africa in line with the TICAD II – Tokyo Agenda for Action (TAA). As a result, the “Asia-Africa Investment Information Service Center,” with SIBEXLINK of Malaysia a semi-governmental organization was established to provide investment information through the Internet, and launching of an Asia-Africa Business Forum for trade and investment promotion between Asia and Africa.⁴⁷

In TICAD III, in September 2003, concerning the promotion of trade and investment, African countries appealed for enhancement of trade and investment rather than aid in order to create employment and expand exportations. Therefore, in TICAD III, it was declared that trade and investment through “Joint Public/Private Asia/Africa Forum” and the “Asia-African Business Forum (AABF) for promotion of small and medium scale enterprises should be supported. As a result, in TICAD III, it was agreed that the support for Japanese companies to Africa should be extended through JBIC's investment loans of

⁴⁵ Japanese Trade and Investment Statistics, *Historical Data – Japan's Outward FDI* [online], 2004, available at: <http://www.jetro.go.jp/en/reports/statistics/>, accessed May 19, 2009.

⁴⁶ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁷ OECD, *Development Co-operation Review Series Japan* no. 34, Paris: OECD, 1999, p. 91-2.

around 300 million USD for the next five years.⁴⁸ As of 2006, Japan had already surpassed its pledge by reaching US\$360 million.⁴⁹

The Yokohama Declaration, which was adopted at TICAD IV, in May 2008, also acknowledged the importance of developing regional infrastructure. In TICAD IV, Japan announced its decision to create a facility within the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) for investment (i.e. equity investment guarantees and local financing) in Africa of \$2.5 billion over the next five years.⁵⁰ This is twice the total FDI flows from Japan to Africa during the past five years (2003-2007) when TICAD III (2003) was organized or twice the size of Japanese FDI stock in Africa in 2007.⁵¹ Also, as a follow-up of TICAD IV (Yokohama Action Plan), other actions to boost economic growth, besides regional transport infrastructure and regional power infrastructure, include water-related infrastructure, enhanced involvement of regional institutions, and promotion of public-private partnership (PPP) in infrastructure.

The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) notes that to promote structural transformation and maximize the contribution of capital flows to achieve sustainable growth, African countries must adopt an appropriate policy mix to direct ODA and FDI towards directly productive activities, especially non-extractive sectors, and upgrade the physical infrastructure, in order to enhance regional integration, thus increasing the intraregional movement of capital and labour, and expansion of markets for local producers.⁵² This is precisely the broad goal of TICAD and of Japanese aid assistance that has placed emphasis on the provision of economic infrastructure in its ODA, thus correlated with the ECA requirements.⁵³

4. Evolution of Japan's aid policy to Africa and the TICAD Process

Japan had few economic relations with Africa during the period of European colonial rule, and until the end of the 1960s Africa received low priority

⁴⁸ TCSF White Paper 2007, *Evaluation by Civil Society on Japan's Policy To Africa – Strategic Recommendations on Tokyo International Conference on Africa Development*, Tokyo: TICAD Civil Society Forum, March 2008, p.51.

⁴⁹ Japan's International Cooperation, *Japan's Official Development Assistance White Paper 2008*, Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 2009, p.28.

⁵⁰ UNCTAD, *World Investment Report – Transnational Corporations, and the Infrastructure Challenge*, New and Geneva: United Nations, 2008, p.44.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

⁵² United Nations – Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), *Economic Report on Africa 2006 – Capital Flows and Development Financing in Africa*, Ethiopia: Economic Commission for Africa, December 2006, p. 12-13.

⁵³ MOFA, *Building Global Partnerships for Development: Japan's Contribution to MDG 8*, Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, September 2005, p. 8.

in Japan's bilateral ODA. In fact, Japanese government did not have a clear policy in relation to the use of ODA for economic development in Africa. Instead, Japan believed that trade and investment should be the most effective means for economic cooperation.⁵⁴

In this context, ODA should be used to prepare a politically environment for private investment in recipient African countries, and at allaying African countries fear that all Japan seeks is to extract minerals and other raw materials.⁵⁵ Later, Japan also began to use foreign aid as a major pillar of foreign policy not only as an economic tool, as articulated in its Comprehensive National Security (CNS) policy, but also with strategic considerations to maintain the diplomatic support of the African countries in its anti-communist drives.⁵⁶ The influence of economic ministries in managing aid policy also explains the coordination of ODA with trade and investment policies, and Japanese business interests in ODA activities as well, situation that remains until the present day.⁵⁷

In relation to the evolution of the Japanese aid policy to Africa, it can be divided in five phases. The first phase (1954-1972) was characterized by Japan's membership of the Colombo plan and from the ascension of Japan from aid recipient to an aid donor. Aid to Africa, however, was restricted until the 1960s by the priority given to Asia.⁵⁸

In the second phase (1973-1980), following the oil crisis, although the share of Japan's total trade to Africa did not increase due to economic and political instability. However, the Zenko Suzuki's cabinet (1980-1982) adopted the policy of comprehensive security as national strategy, and expanded its aid beyond Asia toward Africa to reduce resource vulnerability.⁵⁹ Japan's aid policy toward Africa was also used to supplement the American strategic aid programs to halt the communism in Africa.⁶⁰ Finally, behind the economic security and strategic considerations was the importance of African political support for Japan's long wish of becoming a UNSC member, which gradually increased.

Japan's third phase (1981-1988) is characterized by the continuation of Japanese dual diplomacy toward Africa. ODA was provided to prevent Africa's

⁵⁴ INUKAI, "Japan and sub-Saharan Africa," in Japan's Foreign Aid, p. 254.

⁵⁵ INUKAI, "Japan and sub-Saharan Africa," p. 255; Guy Arnold, *Aid in Africa*, London: Kogan Page, 1979, p. 90.

⁵⁶ AMPIAH, *The Dynamics of Japan's aid relations with Africa*, p. 56; Owwoeye, *Japan's Policy in Africa*, p. 98.

⁵⁷ DAVID ARASE, *Buying Power – The Political Economy of Japan's Foreign Aid*, London: Lynne Rienner, 1995, p. 6-7.

⁵⁸ DAVID M. POTTER and PEDRO MIGUEL AMAKASU RAPOSO DE MEDEIROS CARVALHO, "Characteristics of Japan's and China's Aid Policies," *Academia Humanities and Social Sciences*, volume 88, January 2009, p. 230.

⁵⁹ TAKEHIKO OCHIALI, "Beyond TICAD Diplomacy," p. 40.

⁶⁰ INUKAI, "Japan and Sub-Saharan Africa," p. 259-60.

economic and famine crisis, and simultaneously to accommodate the protests of African countries, especially Zambia and Mozambique over Japan's relationship with the apartheid regime in South Africa.⁶¹ In order to have access to Africa's natural resources and diplomatic influence in the United Nations, Japan needed to improve its image in Africa. Also, for the first time, Japan's development experience attained in Asia in the late 1960s and early 1970s are adapted to Africa. The plan named "Green Revolution for Africa" aimed the improvement of infrastructure for rural and agriculture development, reforestation movements, and support for policy reform for rural and agricultural development. As a result, Japan's bilateral ODA to Africa in 1981 amounted to US\$252 million, almost five times the US\$59 millions in 1975, and reached US\$884 million in 1988.

Japan's fourth phase (1989-2000) is marked by the end of the Cold War, aid fatigue among the donor community, and the failure of the structural adjustment. As a result, and after clarifying the political and development purposes of its aid programme in the ODA Charter in October 1992, Japan decided to organize the TICAD conference. It is worth to tell that these international conferences on African development were the first of its kind, and meant that Japan was committing itself politically toward a continent that so far did not have great expression in Japan's foreign aid policy behind economical reasons. The importance of TICAD I is that served to realign the international community's waning interest in Africa with the new topic being Asian experience and African development. As for TICAD II, gave emphasis to the positive role of the State in economic policy with the concept of ownership (principle of self-help) becoming an implicit principle in the Tokyo Declaration.⁶²

Japan's last phase (2001-present) is marked by the revision of the ODA Charter in 2003, and the reforms of Japanese ODA according with the ODA Charter so that assistance can be provided in a more transparent upon the public opinion. As a result, among other reforms, the most important is perhaps the amendment of the (Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) law, which now is responsible for the implementation of the three schemes of ODA loans (previously handled by Japan Bank For International Cooperation (JBIC), grant aid, and technical cooperation. JICA by combining these three

⁶¹ ROBERT M. ORR, JR. *The Emergence of Japan's Foreign Aid Power*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1990, p. 96.

⁶² SHINSUKE HORIUCHI, "African Development and the TICAD Process," *Japan Review of International Affairs*, volume 17, no.4, Winter 2003, p. 260; HOWARD LEHMAN, "Japan's Foreign Aid Policy to Africa since the Tokyo International Conference on African Development," *Pacific Affairs*, volume 78, no.3, Fall 2005, p. 428.

⁶³ Japan's International Cooperation, *Japan's Official Development Assistance White Paper 2008*, Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 2009, p. 17.

schemes can allow a more efficient and effective implementation of Japan's assistance. The maintenance of the TICAD Process with TICAD III and IV is the recognition from both sides (Asia and Africa) of the progress evident in both political and economic fields since TICAD III was held in 2003.⁶³

Also, at the Kyushu-Okinawa Summit in 2000, Japan invited the leaders of African countries for the first time contributing to put African issues on the agenda of the G8. At the G8 Hokkaido Toyako Summit, in Tokyo on July 2008, the G8 leaders reaffirmed their commitment to achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and reconfirmed their commitment made at the G8 Gleneagles Summit (2005) to increase ODA to Africa behind 2011, and welcomed the contributions of TICAD IV. As a result, the G8 recognized the importance of the priority topics of TICAD IV, such as (1) boosting growth in Africa, (2) ensuring human security, including the achievement of the MDGs, and consolidation of peace and good governance, and (3) addressing environmental issues and climate change.⁶⁴

5. Human Security, ODA, and TICAD

Human Security (HS) is a concept that United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Human Development Report (HDR) introduced in 1994. According to these report, human security consists of two elements: "Freedom from want" (protection from deprivation in the patterns of daily life) and "freedom from fear" (violent conflict and non violent threats). Since want and fear are not separable phenomena, want may imply fear, while fear may generate further want, "human security" requires an integrated approach that incorporates both aspects.⁶⁵ In this line, the concept of human security involves a fundamental departure from an orthodox international relations security analysis that has the security of states as the primary subjects of international law to concentrate on individuals.⁶⁶

The concept of HS in Japanese foreign policy emerged out of ODA, and is similar to that of the UNDP- HDR of 1994. Meanwhile, certain key events in international relations in the late 1990s, especially the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis highlighted the significance of economic threats to individuals, awakening in Japanese political leaders, particularly Japanese Prime Minister, Keizo

⁶⁴ Ibid., 15

⁶⁵ JICA, *Poverty Reduction and Human Security*, Tokyo: Institute for International Cooperation, March 2006, xiii.

⁶⁶ CAROLINE THOMAS, "Global Governance, Development and Human Security: Exploring the Links," in *International Security – Debating Security and Strategy and the Impact of 9-11*, volume IV, ed. Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore: Sage Publications, 2007, p. 193.

Obuchi the importance of human security. As a result, in December 1998, in Hanoi, Vietnam, Obuchi defined human security as a concept “that takes a comprehensive view of all threats to human survival, life and dignity and stresses the need to respond to such threats.” In this speech, Obuchi clearly located HS in Japan’s foreign policy and announced the Trust Fund for Human Security (TFHS) under the UN, and considers Africa as a priority region of application of the fund.⁶⁷ As to March 2007, Japan contributed approximately 33.5 billion JPY to the TFHS established in the UN in 1999. Also in 1999, in a speech at the UN House in Tokyo, Obuchi, warned to the fact that threats to human security differ by country and region, whereas in Africa the chief threats are poverty, disease and conflict.⁶⁸

In the post-Cold War, the shift of Japan’s ODA towards peace building and the human security as a concept of foreign policy represents a new opportunity to Japan enhance its diplomatic power, and to strengthen his role in the international arena. Canada and Norway also consider human security a pillar of their countries foreign polices and are active in their promotion. They are the leaders of the Human Security Network (1999) of like-minded states, which emphasizes the “freedom from fear” component of human security in contrast to UNDP’s insistence on the importance of the “freedom from want” aspect of human security. However, differences exist in the way Japan and these countries approach human security. For example, Canada emphasizes “freedom from fear” with a tendency for prevention of conflict and humanitarian intervention, while Japan stresses “freedom from want” placing importance in development assistance.⁶⁹ Contrary to Canada and Norway, Japan is critical of actions taken in the name of humanitarian principles based on the belief that it would erode the support of the human security ideal by the international community as many countries are afraid of coercive, external intervention, and that conflicts should be treated by the existing mechanisms.⁷⁰

In sum, TICAD embraces a broader conception of national interest covering political, regional and security issues, economic and developmental matters,

⁶⁷ KEIZO OBUCHI, “Toward the Creation of a Bright Future for Asia,” [Lecture Program hosted by the Institute for International Relations, Hanoi, Vietnam, December 16, 1998, p.3-4. Database on Basic Documents of Japan-Asean Relations, Department of Advanced Social and International Studies, University of Tokyo, available <http://citrus.c.u-tokyo.ac.jp/projects/ASEAN/J-ASEAN/Jas19981216E%20Speech%20Obuc>, accessed May 26, 2009.

⁶⁸ KEIZO OBUCHI, “In Quest of Human Security,” Tokyo: Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), 1999, p. 8. <http://www.jiia.or.jp/pdf40th-e.pdf>, accessed May 26, 2009.

⁶⁹ JICA, *Project Study on the TICAD Process*, p. 70.

⁷⁰ ASTRI SUHRKE, “Human Security and Interest of States,” in *International Security – Debating Security and Strategy and the Impact of 9-11*, volume IV, ed. Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore: Sage Publications, 2007, p. 125; MAKOTO SATO, “Human Security and Japanese Diplomacy,” in *Protecting Human Security*, p. 84.

social and environmental problems. TICAD is not the only channel through which Japan conducts its foreign policy to Africa, nor is TICAD the sole determinant of Japan's external policy to Africa. However, when human security is adopted as a government's foreign policy, like in Japan's case and considered a priority of the TICAD process, the paradigm of human security is redefined so as to serve the state national interests, such as the promotion of Japan's economic status, greater influence in the United Nations, and increased credibility in the international stage vis-à-vis the United States.⁷¹

Conclusion

From the 1960s to the mid-1970s, Japan's foreign policy to Africa and aid policy as well served as an extension of Japan's own post war reconstruction in search of markets and resource acquisition efforts. However, in the 1980s, Japan's politicisation of aid became an instrument trying to deflect African and western criticisms of its dual diplomacy toward Africa. Simultaneously, in late 1980s and early 1990s, the Japanese government began to stress the importance of and shifting its emphasis on to humanitarian and software aid (social development). Between 1991 and 2000, Japan had to reformulate its role in international contributions, as it was now playing an important role in PKO and ODA as well. However, it can be said that only recently, with TICAD, Japan has shown some degree of activism in its foreign policy. For most of the long period, Japan has practiced resource diplomacy and followed the Western countries and its main ally (USA), and has been called a "reactive state" with no vision and no ideas in its foreign policy. But it is fair to say that Japan through TICAD is developing a degree of proactive international leadership and human contribution not only for conflict prevention and resolution of conflicts but also with its own experience of development acquired mostly in Asia, and linking hardware aid (infrastructure) and human security as a new foreign policy concept for Africa's development. Although, TICAD has created the instruments to realize Japan's human security policy, there is a risk of incoherence if officials promote domestic interests at the cost of development of developing countries. As a result, Japan should emphasize more poverty reduction for example, prioritizing direct investment in the area of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and ensure that narrower national interests do not override this objective.

⁷¹ SHAHRBANOU TADJBAKSH and ANURADHA M. CHENOY, *Human Security – Concepts and Implications* [London and New York: Routledge, 2007, p.29.

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